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THE "LABOR ARISTOCRACY" THESIS CONSIDERED ONCE AGAIN: 
ELITE MINE WORKERS ON THE NORTHERN RHODESIAN COPPERBELT 1926 - 1966 
by Jane Parpart 
Scholars of the working class in both developed and less-developed 
countries have long recognized that the upper stratum of the working class 
often behave in ways that subvert the best interests of the class as a whole, 
In order to explain this behavior, some scholars have turned to the concept of 
a labor aristocracy, First developed by Engels and then Lenin, this concept 
asserts that "certain distinctive upper strata of the working class are better 
paid, better trusted and generally regarded as more 'respectable' and 
politically moderate than the mass of the proletariat, ,,l Thus, structural 
class position is imbued with certain behavioral patterns, Relatively 
privileged workers are assumed to be more interested in maintaining their 
advantageous position than in improving the conditions of the working class as 
a whole, Indeed, they are accused of often identifying more closely with the 
aspirations and values of the middle class than with their own class. 2 
In Africa, both Marxist and liberal scholars have used the labor 
aristocracy thesis to explain the frequent lack of revolutionary, and even 
trade-union consciousness, among African workers. Fanon dismissed the African 
workers as a pampered lot, incapable of revolutionary action, 3 Less 
sweeping in their judgment against African workers as a whole, Arrighi and 
Saul nevertheless concluded that the skilled and semi-skilled African workers 
of international corporations had been co-opted and were a conservative force 
in both African politics and industrial relations, 4 Liberal social 
scientists arrived at similar conclusions, claiming that the power structure 
in Africa undercut opportunities for urban workers to initiate revolutionary 
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action, even in the unlikely event that they exhibited the capacity and 
willingness to do so. 5 All of these scholars see fully proletarianized 
African workers as a relatively privileged group in African society, who are 
more interested in maintaining the status quo than in supporting revolutionary 
change. 
More recently, some scholars have challenged the relevance of the labor 
aristocracy thesis for Africa. On an empirical level, the cost of living in 
urban centers, remittances to relatives in the country, and extended family 
obligations markedly reduce the differential between the living standards of 
the urban proletariat and the rest of the urban poor. 6 On a behavioral 
level, these scholars suggest that rather than behave as labor aristocrats, 
urban workers have often played a leading role in the struggle against social 
and economic inequality. Jeffries found a quite exceptional level of 
militancy and radical political consciousness among the Ghanaian skilled 
railway workers. Both he and Peace regard the skilled workers as the most 
probable political elite of the urban masses, while Sandbrook and Arn stress 
the potential leadership of African workers in populist politics. 
However, a number of scholars still contend that some African workers fit 
the labor aristocracy model. Recent work by Konings on the Ashanti Goldfields 
Corporation reveals evidence of reformist rather than revolutionary 
consciousness among the skilled miners. Sandbrook agrees that a stronger 
sense of political conservatism is generally found among African mine workers 
than among workers in other large-scale industries in Africa. 8 The elite 
stratum of the Zambian copper miners are frequently cited as evidence for this 
thesis. They are one of the few groups of workers with significantly higher 
living standards than the urban poor and the peasantry, and they played little 
apparent part in the struggle for independence. Despite evidence that the 
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miners perceived and disliked the corporate power elite of union leadership, 
white management, and the black government, Sandbrook continues to see the 
Zambian miners as a militantly economistic lot "whose political potential at 
i b . ..9 best rema ns am iguous. 
Closer examination of the upper stratum of the Zambian mine work force 
raises certain questions about this assumption. At times the elite stratum of 
the Copperbelt miners were the leading edge of collective worker protest, 
while at others they behaved like typical labor aristocrats, allied with 
management, and refused to cooperate with the mass of the work force. What 
then can we say about the factors determining this range of behavior? A 
closer look at the Copperbelt miners during the colonial period should provide 
some answers. 
Stabilization 
First we must identify the existence of an upper stratum of workers on the 
Copperbel t. The copper industry in Central Africa was unique in the early 
stabilization of a section of its African labor force. This was the result of 
a conjunction of different factors which I have discussed in greater detail 
elsewhere. Suffice it to say that initially a shortage of both European and 
African labor in Central Africa, during a period of severe competition in the 
world copper market, forced the Copperbelt mining companies -- Anglo-American 
Corporation (AA) and Rhodesian Selection Trust (RST) -- to compete for labor 
with the Union Miniere copper company in Katanga. This company had begun 
stabilizing African labor in 1927. In order to attract experienced African 
miners, the Copperbelt companies followed Union Miniere' s lead and permitted 
these miners to bring their families to the mines and to remain in employment 
for longer periods. 10 The companies gave these men somewhat higher wages, 
better housing, some food for dependents, and special welfare facilities. 
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Despite a slight change of policy during the labor glut of the Depression, the 
recurring labor shortage after the Depression and the increasing need for 
experienced miners soon forced the mines back to their stabilization 
policies. This was especially true of RST's Roan Antelope mine, which needed 
a higher complement of skilled miners due to the nature of the ore body. 11 
The companies soon perceived the cost advantages of using skilled and 
semi-skilled black labor rather than more expensive white labor, and they 
became increasingly committed to stabilizing a portion of the black work force 
on the mines. As early as 1940, the companies began pushing for African 
advancement -- that is, the introduction of black miners into more highly 
skilled jobs. The war and opposition from the European Mine Workers' Union 
(established in 1937) stymied corporate efforts in this direction. However, 
the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 diluted 
the influence of the European miners, and the companies successfully pushed 
through African advancement agreements in 1955 and 1960. African 
stabilization increased accordingly. In 1959, 31 percent of the miners were 
semi-skilled and 4 percent were skilled; and the turnover rate for African 
labor in 1962 had fallen to 9.3 percent, not much higher than the rate for 
European labor. 12 
Labor Aristocrats? 
Now that we have established the existence of a stratum of stabilized 
experienced black labor on the Copperbelt, we can ask the question -- did 
these miners behave like labor aristocrats? Before 1953, for the most part, 
we have to answer no. Although not highly organized, the leadership that did 
emerge during the 1935 strike consisted primarily of longer service miners, 
especially clerks. One of the major sources of leadership and organization in 
that strike the Watch Tower catered to urbanized, more educated 
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Africans. 13 The elite miners dominated the leadership of the much better 
organized strike in 1940. Some resentment towards compound clerks surfaced, 
undoubtedly aggravated by the large number of Malawian clerks. However, most 
of the stabilized miners not only supported the strike, but also called for 
and organized collective action by the entire black work force. During the 
war years, some of the supervisory workers managed to obtain worker 
representation for themselves, and concentrated on improving their own 
position. This failed, and right after the war, these workers, along with 
other elite miners, spearheaded a successful drive for unionization. The 
success of the African Mine Workers' Union (established in 1948) owed much to 
the leadership and support of these miners. 
After 1953, the upper stratum of the black mine work force began to act 
more like labor aristocrats. In 1954, the companies established special 
associations for supervisory workers, which became mandatory the following 
year. Throughout the rest of the colonial period, estrangement between these 
workers and the daily paid miners increased. Even those staff miners who 
sympathized with the union could not overcome suspicions that they were in 
league with management. And yet, in 1960 the staff miners joined the union to 
fight for a unitary wage-scale, in 1963 they allied with the nationalist party 
(UNIP) and tried to establish a new union, and in 1966, they once again joined 
the union in a massive strike against management and the government. 14 
The Class Struggle and Worker Behavior 
How can we explain this behavior? The easy way out would be simply to 
adopt an empiricist stance, to conclude that every case is unique, and to 
reject the relevance of theory altogether. Clearly, this case does point out 
the limitations of the structural approach. The position of the elite miners 
in the Copperbelt work force does not explain their behavior in and of itself. 
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However, the Copperbelt case does reveal a tendency towards division 
within the working class along occupational lines. As we have seen, at 
various points supervisory miners (particularly clerks) rejected broadly based 
collective action in favor of more limited negotiations with management. This 
occurred despite the fact that these stabilized miners had proven at other 
times their understanding of class identity, the need for collective action, 
and their commitment to the class struggle. 
It seems that while working and living on the mines generally facilitated 
identification among the black mine workers, life on the mines also clarified 
the divisions between supervisory and non-supervisory miners. On the level of 
consumption, the mass of the mine work force could see that the supervisory 
workers received somewhat better housing, pay, and rations. Management 
designed much of the welfare and recreational activities for these workers and 
their families as well. In the work place, the African supervisors wielded 
authority over less experienced African laborers, had generally better working 
conditions, and regular contact with European miners in order to coordinate 
production. It is difficult to measure exactly how much these differences 
divided the work force, but it is instructive that divisions within the black 
work force deepened in the 1950s, when the mines sharply increased the 
differential rewards given to supervisory and non-supervisory black miners. 15 
Another potential sore point between supervisory and daily paid miners 
centered around the supervisors' superior bargaining power with management. 
Experienced workers were more difficult to replace than unskilled laborers. 
The companies had not only invested time and money training them, but they 
also faced a general shortage of experienced miners in Central Africa. The 
supervisory miners also had more access to European miners and management 
because of the need to coordinate production. This was particularly true of 
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those African supervisors who worked in the compound offices, hospitals, 
welfare facilities, and other non-manual occupations • .And it was these miners 
who most consistently separated themselves off from the rest of the black 
miners, and were frequently viewed with suspicion by the rest of the black 
work force. Thus, the upper stratum of the black miners had more leverage in 
the class struggle a fact which could easily lead to resentment and 
divisions between these workers and the rest of the African miners. 16 
Although this tendency towards division along occupational lines is 
important, clearly structural class position alone cannot explain worker 
behavior. It is the contention of this paper that elite worker behavior is 
best understood by examining the struggle between labor and capital in 
concrete historic circumstances. Only then can we understand the options 
which workers had, or believed they had, in the class struggle. 
Obviously, one key ingredient in this struggle was the slow but steady 
development of class identity, collective worker protest, and organization 
among the black mine workers. The tradition of ·protests, the lessons learned 
from the European union and government labor officers, and the experience of 
organizing an effective trade union influenced worker behavior. 
Corporate labor strategy also shaped the struggle between labor and 
capital on the Copper belt. Of course, this strategy did not occur in a 
vacuum. Managerial policies were affected by the techniques of copper 
production, the economy of Northern Rhodesia, as well as the larger world 
economy. Competition with other copper producers in the volatile metals 
market always limited the range of actions open to the copper companies. 
The class struggle was also influenced by the nature of the colonial 
state. Following recent work by Berman and Lonsdale, we see the colonial 
state as a special form of the twentieth century capitalist state. It must 
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ensure the reproduction and accumulation of capital, while also maintaining 
political reproduction that is, the pattern of class domination and 
subordination in the state. This necessitates not only intervention in class 
struggles, but also involvement in a range of ideological activities to 
justify the existing system. It also demands a certain level of autonomy in 
order to maintain the illusion of concern for the social order as a whole. 
This is all the more complicated in a colonial state because of the need to 
provide for accumulation and legitimation for two different modes of 
production. As a result, the colonial state had to restructure the 
precapitalist mode of production to fit the new colonial economy. This social 
engineering was complex and often neces·sitated the use of force as well as 
persuasion. Thus, the colonial state was a central actor in the class 
struggles •17 
Let us look now at the interaction between labor and capital on the copper 
mines during the colonial period to see how the various factors mentioned 
above shaped the behavior of the elite miners on the Copperbelt. 
In the early years of the mines, management did not believe Africans could 
organize collective labor protests. Their main concern was to create a 
disciplined, organized, low-cost labor force. They used more experienced 
African miners in production and had them train the large number of unskilled 
recruits. The compound managers worried that unduly obvious privileges for 
the elite strtum of workers would create dissension within the black work 
force, and therefore impair labor efficiency. As a result, management did 
everything possible to minimize the differences between short- and long-term 
labor (generally unskilled and more skilled labor), while still providing 
enough rewards to attract and maintain a stabilized stratum of the black work 
force. 
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While discouraging division along occupational lines, the companies did 
try to inhibit worker solidarity by emphasizing ethnic differences among the 
miners. They established "tribal representatives." First started at Roan in 
1936, this system encouraged African miners to take their domestic problems to 
elders in their ethnic group. Every twenty-five persons of one ethnic group 
elected a representative. These representatives were generally older men. A 
domestic problem only went to the compound manager after a "tribal 
representative" had failed to solve it. The companies also encouraged chiefs 
and other traditional dignitaries to visit the mine compounds. 18 This 
reinforced the importance of traditional values and emphasized the temporary 
nature of African life in the towns. 
In the 1930s, the Northern Rhodesia government for the most part let 
management have a free hand on the mines. The government was desperately 
short of funds during the Depression, and colonial officials continued to 
limit expenditures long after normal economic activity had resumed. Most of 
the colony's revenue came from the mines, and so government officials 
generally tried to support company policies. The government passed South 
African-style labor laws to help supply the mines with sufficient controllable 
labor. Legislation regulating urban Africans also reinforced the temporary 
nature of African urban residence and the importance of the traditional power 
structure. The interests of white settlers and white labor did not as yet 
conflict with this policy. 19 
As we have seen, corporate attempts to limit divisions within the African 
work force along occupational lines worked better than planned. The more 
experienced miners spearheaded strikes in both 1935 and 1940. They ignored 
the "tribal representatives," and called for workers to unite against 
management. In 1940, the strike leaders made it quite clear that they 
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understood the identity of interests between themselves and the rest of the 
work force. They called for black worker unity along lines similar to the 
European union's recent strike, and promised success as long as everyone just 
refused to work and said what they wanted. 20 
In response, the companies began to consider advancing some of the more 
skilled African miners into previously white-dominated jobs in hopes of both 
saving money and stemming elite worker dissatisfaction and possible collective 
protest; government officials, however, could not accept such a plan. The 
European mine workers had become an important voting block in the legislature, 
and the government did not want to risk the wrath of the European union by 
supporting African advancement. At the same time, the Colonial Office pressed 
the Northern Rhodesian government into establishing an African Labor 
Department. This was part of an empire-wide development -- labor departments 
were created in various parts of British Africa with the clear intention of 
reducing tension between capital and labor, and therefore maintaining the 
economic prosperity of the empire. 21 
As a result, African advancement plans were stymied. The war stopped 
opportunities for large-scale worker protest. The more skilled miners decided 
to negotiate with management on their own. They complained to the labor 
officers, and in 1942 the Labor Department convinced the companies to 
establish "boss boy committees" to represent these miners. The boss boys 
initially agreed to limit representation to their occupational group alone. 
Perhaps they might have abandoned more broadly based collective action if 
management had offered them special concessions. However, management refused, 
claiming that significant improvements in pay and work could only come with an 
advancement plan. Disgruntled with management's failure to offer them special 
consideration, the boss boy committees began to demand worker representation 
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for the entire black work force. Some of them even decided that African 
miners should establish junior branches of the European Mine Workers' Union in 
order to have some form of worker representation against management, This 
possibility frightened government and, to a lesser extent, company officials, 
and precipitated the establishment of an African union. The stabilized miners 
joined the union in large numbers. They used their influence to draw miners 
to union meetings, to reassure the doubtful, and to press forward claims for 
improved conditions at work and in the compounds. 22 
Initially the companies responded to the African union by pressing 
government and labor officials to contain the union's demands. The labor 
officers had to walk a fine line between their paternalistic concerns for 
African labor and the need to 
treasuries. Although sometimes 
maintain 
aggravated 
high profits 
by managerial 
for government 
pressure, and 
determined to teach the rudiments of collective bargaining to the miners, the 
labor officers agreed to emphasize the need to keep worker demands within 
reason that is, within the wishes of management. More important in this 
period of emerging African nationalism, the labor officers agreed to teach 
union leaders that politics should be kept out of union affairs. 23 They 
maintained the fiction that politics had nothing to do with the class 
struggle, and thus disseminated an ideology designed to undercut the 
development of political class consciousness among the miners. 
However, plans to advance more Africans into skilled and semi-skilled jobs 
continued to attract management. Fearing the wrath of the European union, 
which had locked most semi-skilled and skilled jobs into European only 
categories during the war, the companies tried to win government support for 
their African advancement plan. The influence of the white miners in the 
Northern Rhodesian government stymied these efforts until the establishment of 
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the Federation in 1953 altered the balance of power. The interests of the 
white miners were submerged in the larger issues of the Federation. The 
Federation needed mining profits, and in order to placate the companies, it 
agreed to ignore any confrontation with the European union, and to let go of 
some reserved positions, and in 1955 and 1960 African advancement plans were 
successfully negotiated with the European union. 
Now that they had committed themselves to enlarging the stabilized black 
work force, the companies had to figure out how to control these workers. 
Fissures had been emerging within the African union along occupational lines. 
Rivalry between manual and non-manual supervisory miners caused hard 
feelings. In 1952, the secretary-general, Simon Kaluwa, a clerk at Rhokana, 
was dismissed from the union when he refused to maintain a position in the 
union for a union .leader recently dismissed by management for organizing an 
illegal strike. The companies decided to play on this division, and indeed to 
institutionalize it, by creating a supervisory worker's association -- the 
Mines African Staff Association (MASA). They encouraged clerks to join. At 
the same time, the Federal government had agreed to establish an African 
"middle class, " which would hopefully be loyal to the Federal idea and would 
therefore act as a buffer between the African masses and the white 
population. The creation of an elite category of black miners fit into this 
program. As a result, the government supported company policies and when the 
African union called a series of rolling strikes to protest MASA, the 
government declared a state of emergency and banished the strike leaders from 
the Copper belt, The companies then forced all supervisory miners into MASA, 
Basking in the high profits of the 1950s, management also stepped up special 
welfare and recreational programs for these miners and systematically improved 
their housing and other conditions of employment. In every way possible, the 
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companies sought to separate the supervisory miners from the rest of the black 
24 
work force, 
It is generally asserted in the literature on the Zambian miners that the 
supervisory black miners readily joined MASA and split off from the union, It 
is quite clear that some did, And the rivalry between manual and non-manual 
mine workers over union leadership was undoubtedly a leading factor in this 
division. Those miners who joined MASA obviously felt they could negotiate 
better terms of employment through the association than they could get in the 
union, and they were willing to try that form of labor action. However, most 
elite miners recognized MASA as an attempt to weaken the union, They fought 
against the association, and only joined it when the companies forced them 
to. Some eligible miners accepted demotions rather than join, 25 
Company and government officials joined forces to stop mine worker 
involvement in politics as well. The labor officers and the compound managers 
(now "African personnel managers") informed both daily-paid and staff miners 
that they must keep politics out of the work place, Political meetings in the 
compounds could only be held with permission from management, and those 
persons involved in illegal meetings were quickly dismissed. After a few such 
dismissals in 1957, daily-paid miners recognized the futility of union 
involvement in politics for the time being. Staff miners, who did not even 
have a strike clause, adopted a similarly economistic line, Both groups 
continued to belong to the African nationalist parties -- African National 
Congress (ANC) and later the United National Independence Party (UNIP) -- but 
they kept politics strictly out of union and association affairs. 26 
During the next eight years, staff miners were in a beleaguered position. 
The violent antipathy generated by the union's fight against MASA created an 
atmosphere in which union members came to distrust all supervisory workers. 
Wives and children of staff members were ostracized in the compounds. 
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This 
increased the divisions between daily paid workers and staff men, and 
increasingly threw MASA members into alliance with management• Hostility on 
the part of MASA members towards daily-paid workers increased under this 
pressure. It became easier to draw into the protection of the special housing 
areas and club facilities provided by the companies, Staff members and their 
families spent more and more of their time in the compounds with each other, 
Those who tried to maintain friendships with union members frequently suffered 
distrust and 
isolation, 27 
disappointment, This led to even greater frustrations and 
Thus, increasingly staff miners on the Copperbelt behaved like 
the typical labor aristocrat -- interested in their stratum's well-being and 
unwilling to engage in broadly based collective labor action, 
Comforting though this behavior may be to those wanting to prove the labor 
aristocracy thesis, the evidence does not warrant such complacency, Despite 
estrangements between staff and daily-paid workers, the association and the 
African Mine Workers' Union joined forces in 1960 in an effort to create a 
unitary wage scale. The staff association miners clearly recognized that the 
color bar was a common problem for all black workers, no matter how 
privileged, and their willingness to join with the entire black work force 
reveals a continuing understanding of the importance of broadly based 
collective labor action, The association only withdrew from this effort under 
extreme pressure from the companies -- namely, threats plus the offer of a 14 
percent increase in pay for accepting a separate solution. 28 
By 1962, impending black rule altered the class struggle once again, Some 
of the staff miners recognized the fragility of their alliance with management 
especially with the end of Federal support for an African "middle class," 
These men convinced the membership to establish the United Mine Workers' 
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Union, in close alliance with UNIP and the United Trade Union Congress. 29 
Utilizing UNIP speaking platforms and UNIP methods of door-to-door canvassing, 
the new union leadership campaigned aggressively for members. They called for 
worker unity, claiming that "we are not like the African Mine Workers' Union. 
We want those underground to join with the educated levels so that we can 
fight together. It is practically impossible today to challenge the companies 
d . l .. 30 an win a one. Some miners joined the fold, attracted by the possibility 
of UNIP's support against management after independence. 31 
The African Mine Workers' Union fought against the new union not because 
it opposed a single union, which it did not, but because it opposed a union 
which threatened the established union leadership. Supported by management, 
which feared the new union's political connections, the African Mine Workers' 
Union launched a vituperative campaign against the new union. "Only fools," 
they claimed, ""could now support leaders who had proved so treacherous in the 
past... To prove their dedication to the entire mine work force, the union 
agreed to a new manning structure and local wage scale in return for a general 
wage increase. In return, the companies made transferring from the African 
Mine Workers' Union to the United Mine Workers' Union a complicated and very 
public procedure. Each dissident had to wait in highly visible queues, and 
publicly declare his desire for cancellation. The companies also refused to 
recognize the UMU as a legitimate employee organization. Gradually, these 
efforts paid off, and in June 1964, the UMU disbanded, and a new Mines Local 
Staff Association was formed. 32 
Despite this conflict, the staff and daily-paid miners joined forces once 
again in 1966 to protest the local wage structure the mines had pushed through 
during the 1964 crisis over the UMU. This structure tied wages of local 
employees (Zambians) to the Zambian economy rather than to the European wage 
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scale, thus destroying the unitary wage scale so painfully worked out in 
1961. It limited the wage ceiling for daily paid miners, and even lowered the 
wages of some higher grade miners. As a result, all black miners had a common 
complaint, and in 1966 dissatisfaction finally exploded into collective 
action. 
scale. 
accused 
oppress 
Staff and daily-paid miners demanded a return to the unitary wage 
Undaunted by UNIP's rhetoric of concern for the workers, the strikers 
the black Zambian government and white management of colluding to 
them. 33 Once again the miners were able to transcend racial 
divisions, identifying themselves and their opposition in class terms. Thus, 
despite company pressures and considerable distrust, the supervisory miners 
joined in collective labor action with the daily-paid African miners on three 
major occasions between 1960 and 1966. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, we have seen that the labor aristocracy thesis has little 
predictive value for understanding the behavior of the upper stratum of black 
miners on the Copperbelt. Rather than behave consistently as labor 
aristocrats, these miners changed tactics depending on what path they felt 
would be most effective in their struggle with capital. While experiences in 
the production process, both in the mines and the compounds, encouraged the 
development of class consciousness and commitment to class action among elite 
miners, in the Copperbelt case, the form of action taken by these miners 
depended on the real, or perceived, options available to them in the class 
struggle. 
These options were strongly influenced by the conjunction of interests 
between capital and the colonial state in Northern Rhodesia. As usual, 
capital wanted to maximize profits, while both black and white labor wanted to 
maximize wages. The obvious solution for capital -- namely, outright coercion 
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of the work force by the state, was clearly impossible. The state had to 
maintain some semblance of concern for the citizenry, particularly the white 
miners. AB a result, the state ignored mining capital's desire for African 
advancement in order to protect white labor. However, once the Federation 
reduced the influence of the white miners, the state willingly supported 
corporate advancement plans. The companies and the colonial state now faced a 
common problem -- how to permit African advancement without endangering the 
class structure. To accomplish this, they used both the carrot and stick --
rewards to the more skilled Africans who cooperated with the colonial 
government and industry, and punishment to those who refused. The government 
then pointed to successful collaborators to legitimize its rhetoric about 
multi-racial partnership. AB we have seen, the upper stratum of the mine 
workers recognized this situation, and at various points cooperated in order 
to improve their position -- thus acting like labor aristocrats. 
Why then did the stabilized miners participate in both political and 
industrial action during the colonial period? Why weren't they simply 
incorporated into the middle class? The answer, I believe, lies in the 
contradictions of the colonial state. Despite its rhetoric of partnership, 
the colonial class structure in Central Africa was clearly defined by race. 
Too many concessions to Africans threatened the dominance of the whites. 
Consequently, elite Africans in industry and government could never progress 
beyond a certain point. This fact was easily observable in the mines, as was 
collusion between management and the state, particularly after the rolling 
strikes. The elite miners resented the failure of partnership. More than any 
other Africans on the mines, they could envision themselves moving up in a 
multi-racial power structure. When the Federation failed to bring the hoped-
for improvements, the elite miners fought against the racially defined 
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eolonial elass strueture, where feasible, on the mines and in the politieal 
arena. Both the unitary wage-seale and the UMU effort attempted to alter the 
raeial elass strueture in the mines, while support for UNIP refleeted a desire 
to alter the raeial elass strueture of the state. Thus, the nature of the 
eolonial state limited the degree to whieh the upper stratum of the mine 
workers eould benefit from cooperating with capital within the colonial 
structure. This eontradiction pushed the elite miners into alliance with 
other workers and nationalist political parties in order to defend their class 
interests -- behavior certainly not explained by the labor aristocracy thesis. 
What can we say about the political potential of these staff miners since 
independence? We do know that when the elite miners, and indeed the entire 
black mine work force, realized UNIP would not support them against 
management, they struck in defiance of government orders, and openly accused 
the government and the companies of collusion. The severe response to this 
strike was not only due to governmental determination to maintain high copper 
profits, but also signalled an awareness by government officials that the mine 
workers had the organizational potential and political consciousness necessary 
to create a serious resistance movement, perhaps even an opposition party. 
While not exhibiting any desire for a fundamentally reorganized society, and 
certainly open to cooptation, the miners clearly rejected the legitimaey of 
the existing distribution of power and wealth in Zambia. This attitude 
eontinues today, and in the right circumstances, I believe, could lead to a 
worker led popular revolt against the government. Certainly one cannot assume 
from past behavior that the miners will passively accept the growing 
inequalities in Zambia. However, future behavior, like that of the past, will 
depend on the real or perceived options of the miners in the Zambian class 
struggle, and must be examined in that context. 
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